Value Chain Management: An Illustration using Variability Mapping and Decision Frontier Analysis. by Pearson, Mike
Value Chain Management: An Illustration using Variability Mapping and Decision 
Frontier Analysis by Michael Pearson 
 
1.1 A Simple Value Chain: The Stochastic Model and Problem Formulation 
 
A simple value chain is modeled by a contractor (dual operator) making an agreement 
with a customer (primal operator) to complete a project in a number of stages monitored 
within a certain agreed time scale. The customer defines the demand (D) for services 
and products at each stage of the project while the contractor determines the way in 
which these services are supplied (Q), including a safety margin (k e ) to ensure 
customer satisfaction and successful completion on time in the risky environment.  
 
The collaborative objective (assuming normally distributed forecasting errors) is to 
maximize 
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where   indicates the value of the variable when it is positive and zero otherwise. Also
)(1 DE , )(2 QE , 12    and )(k , )(k  are the normal distribution density and 
cumulative distribution functions, respectively, for safety factor, k. The customer and 
contractor agree to complete certain stages of the project perhaps with the assistance 
of a Gantt chart. Probability distributions may be associated with the completion of the 
stages (perhaps by using PERT or other methods). The outcome may lead to certain 
targets not being met, which results in a series of forecasting errors generated at each 
stage of the project. e  is the standard deviation of these jointly calculated forecasting 
errors. The contributions to profit of the customer (downstream operator) and contractor 
(upstream operator) are 
1p
c  and
2p
c , respectively, and
21 ppp
ccc  . The contribution to 
profit for the contractor is the (nominal) payment associated with completing that stage 
minus the contractual costs of completing it. The contribution to profit for the customer is 
calculated in terms of the measurable increase in satisfaction gained from successful 
completion of that stage. The overage and underage costs of the customer are 
1o
c  and
1u
c , respectively, while for the contractor they are 
2o
c  and
2u
c . An interesting feature of 
the problem and the way it is formulated is that the customer’s (primal) overage is the 
same as the contractor’s (dual) underage. The associated costs, however, are not 
necessarily the same.  For instance, the customer may put a certain value on a 
disappointment, such as the failure to deliver on time, which differs from that of the 
contractor. In this context the contractor may face a financial penalty as drawn up in the 
contractual agreement, while the customer faces the disappointment (and possible 
financial loss) when the project defaults at that stage.   
 
1.2 The ‘Mix’ (Overage/Underage) Solution 
 
The mix solution tracks the way in which partners across decision frontiers synchronize 
their efforts to reach optimality (Pearson, 2008a). In this context the decision frontier is 
at the tie which exists between the customer and the contractor. The solution (Appendix 
1) is described by the equation 
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We see that the constant in equation (3) depends on the project costs and contribution 
to profit (where
21 ppp
ccc  ) defined in Section 1.1. The LHS of Eqn. (3) has an 
additional term to the classical fixed variability solution which measures the rate at 
which error variability changes with respect to the ‘mix’ variable  . This assists in the 
identification of the optimal (maximum profit) solution in conditions of increased 
uncertainty.  
 
1.3 The ‘Global’ (Volume) Solution 
 
In contrast to the local (mix) variable,  , the global variable,
 
 , is formulated as the sum 
of expected demand and supply ( 21   ), which assists in the monitoring of change 
in the global market place. The global (‘volume of the total expected demand and supply 
output’) solution is described by the equation (Appendix 1):   
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We see that the constant again depends on the costs and contribution to profit defined 
in section 1.1. The LHS has a single term which measures the rate at which the error 
variability changes with respect to the ‘global’ variable,  . This also assists in the 
identification of the optimal (maximum profit) solution. The two equations (3) and (4) 
form a dynamic system of stochastic differential equations which trace the optimal 
solution in circumstances where variability changes and uncertainty increases or 
decreases over time and with relation to differing contractual and marketing strategies.  
 
2. Phase Planes: An Illustration 
 
We use an example to illustrate the methodology. A city council (customer and primal 
operator) approaches a contractor (dual operator) to install a single route tram system in 
a city. The operators agree that the tram system will be installed in 16 two-monthly 
stages (32 months in all) with monitoring taking place at each stage.  
 
2.1 Local (Mix) Phase Plane 
 
The local phase plane maps the progress of the contractual agreement entered into by 
the operators during the stages of the project. If the mutually agreed targets are exactly 
achieved within the risk environment then both operators will be satisfied and the target 
solution will be achieved (Figure 1). If the path described by the mix plot drifts outside of 
the area of capability (that is, when there is higher overage or underage than planned) 
but still remains within the boundary set by the isovalue line (so that, for instance, the 
contractor fails to meet one of the targets within the time schedule for that stage but still 
meets the overall contribution to profit target by improvements in other areas) then the 
two parties may not be over concerned. If, however, the path drifts outside of the 
boundary described by the profit isovalue line due to high uncertainty and failures in 
forecasting then there may be a need to implement penalties or renegotiate the 
contractual agreement.    
 
 
                              Figure 1 Local (Mix) Phase Plane 
 
Figure 1 illustrates this during the central period of the contract (months 10 to 24). The 
Figure shows the three efficient frontiers (EF) associated with improvement in profit 
(isovalue line, Appendix 2), improvement in underage and improvement in overage 
associated with the risky environment. If the mix plot moves to the wrong side any of the 
efficient frontiers then the path is moving into a suboptimal position with regard to that 
requirement mapped in the uncertain environment. This leads to a risk of a failure of 
coordination and requires adjustment. In our example we see that the project operates 
efficiently at the beginning and the end of its life cycle, but does not do so during the 
central period as the path strays into the area of weak coordination so that the profit 
margins are compromised. The area where the profit improves on the agreed initial 
target lies within the profit isovalue line. The area where the targets for underage (e.g. 
insufficient tram rail laid at this stage of the project) and overage (e.g. excess of tram 
rail laid on unsuitably prepared ground, or exceeding the agreed time scale) lie outside 
of the underage and overage efficient frontiers and so the progress of the project would 
be no longer capable with respect to these targets. In our example the central phase of 
the project reveals a tendency to failures in both of these targets (as well as the profit 
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target) so that there is instability in the chain of operation. To get a more complete 
picture, however, we should also refer to the global phase plane in Figure 2. 
 
2.2 Global Phase Plane 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the progress of the project in the context of the global risk 
environment. After several months the contractors discovered problems in meeting the 
targets agreed at the beginning. Part of the difficulty was the amount of infrastructure 
work which had to be carried out before laying the tram lines. This led to delays and 
increased expense. Another factor was the increased uncertainty due to a recession 
which meant that access to finance was restricted. The efficient frontier determined by 
reference to Eqn. (4) was crossed by the path in the global phase plane leading to 
concern about the viability of continuing with the project. As a result the terms of the 
contract needed to be renegotiated and the schedule changed.  
 
                               Figure 2 Global Phase Plane 
 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
The methodology which makes use of variability mapping, phase planes and decision 
frontier analysis has already been applied in the newsvendor problem and supply chain 
networks (Pearson, 2003, 2006, 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2010). The new approach brings 
rigorous tools for measuring and monitoring coordinated project management between 
networked operators in both a local and global environment of uncertainty. The methods 
are also applicable to value chain management where they can be employed to monitor 
progress in projects open to uncertainty leading to risk but also opportunity. The need to 
distinguish between risk and opportunity in a scientific way can lead to improved value 
chain management and better opportunity discernment. The methodology is currently 
being further developed in order to incorporate dynamic pricing with the ability to identify 
optimality due to price changes in the value chain.    
  
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
12 
14 
16 
18 
20 
200 220 240 260 280 300 
Er
ro
r 
V
ar
ia
b
ili
ty
 
Expected Volume 
Global Plot 
Efficient Frontier 
Area of Opportunity 
Area of Risk 
Start 
end 
Appendix 1 (Two-echelon Proof) (Pearson, 2003) 
Changing Variability The primal-dual objective function makes use of the primal-dual 
transformation. We consider the mix variable, which is the difference between the dual (Q) and 
primal (D) variables. We define X=Q-D and forecast values DQX ˆˆˆ  . We let e  be the 
standard deviation of 12 eee  , where 1e and 2e  are the primal and dual forecasting error terms, 
respectively. Then
ekXX 
ˆ ),(~
2
eekN  , and 12)(  XE . e will have a univariate 
normal distribution with mean zero.  A similar result follows for the global variable, . The 
primal dual transformation is: 12    and 12   , so that 2/)(1   ,
2/)(2   , and 2/1/1   , 2/1/2   , 2/1/1    and 2/1/2   . 
We are then able to find the maximum value of the objective function (1) subject to the 
constraint (2) by applying a Lagrange multiplier with decision variables  ,  and k. We have  
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Equation (29) follows. Furthermore 
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The Hessian determinant is negative definite for 0)( 2    eee . If there were no clear 
maximum, then the structure of the Hessian would need to be investigated. It could be that the 
profit increases without limit as the global output increases. This would happen if  e <0, for 
instance. 
 
Appendix 2 (Equation of Isovalue Line) 
This is derived by substituting the optimal values for the overage ( vo ) and underage ( nu ) into 
Eqn. 1: 
E(Profit) =
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On the isovalue line the LHS of Equations (1) and (App.2.1) are constant. Setting k in Eqn. 
(1),  
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Equating the RHS of (App 2.1) and (App 2.2) gives ]))/()(([
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second result follows by setting k in Eqn. (1). 
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